Abstract
This article examines how the union and management determine the duration of the collective agreement in a decentralized bargaining system characterized by the absence of a rule establishing a maximum duration. Based on information on a population of over 5000 collective agreements and bargaining pairs from the Canadian province of Québec, our analysis reveals that establishment-level collective agreement duration is the result of general economic conditions, but also of coercive comparisons, as well as the parties’ resources and capacities and relative bargaining power, and the characteristics of their interactions. This case shows how contract duration is a strategic issue in establishment-level negotiations where the balance of power generally favours employers.
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