Time for a pluralist approach? Judicial review of non-state decision makers in Canada

Abstract

The doctrinal project of delineating the supervisory jurisdiction of the common law courts and the scholarly project of elucidating the public law–private law divide have had a long and close relationship. The Supreme Court of Canada strengthened this relationship in Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, establishing a bright-line test for the availability of judicial review that takes a presumed state/non-state dichotomy as its organizing principle. In this article, I build on existing critiques of the decision, describing how Wall’s categorical paradigm has reduced the judicial oversight of powerful decision makers that have historically been subject to standards of fairness and rationality. However, I also use Wall to raise a more fundamental question, which is whether the public law–private law divide continues to provide the best vocabulary and framework for determining judicial review’s boundaries. I explore legal pluralism, a project that has developed in parallel with the public law–private law scholarship and consider whether it might provide a superior framework for understanding the challenges to practices of normative decision making that lie at the heart of cases like Wall. I argue that legal pluralism is more phenomenologically correspondent than the public law–private law divide with cases involving norm-generating communities and more coherent with the values that the common law supervisory jurisdiction should be seeking to promote.