Time-Consistent Portfolio Management

Abstract

This paper considers the portfolio management problem for an investor with finite time horizon who is allowed to consume and take out life insurance. Natural assumptions, such as different discount rates for consumption and life insurance, lead to time inconsistency. This situation can also arise when the investor is in fact a group, the members of which have different utilities and/or different discount rates. As a consequence, the optimal strategies are not implementable. We focus on hyperbolic discounting, which has received much attention lately, especially in the area of behavioral finance. Following [I. Ekeland and T. A. Pirvu, Math. Financ. Econ., 2 (2008), pp. 57–86], we consider the resulting problem as a leader-follower game between successive selves, each of whom can commit for an infinitesimally small amount of time. We then define policies as subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. Policies are characterized by an integral equation which is shown to have a solution in the case of constant relative risk aversion utilities. Our results can be extended for more general preferences as long as the equations admit solutions. Numerical simulations reveal that for the Merton problem with hyperbolic discounting, the consumption increases up to a certain time, after which it decreases; this pattern does not occur in the case of exponential discounting and is therefore known in the literature as the “consumption puzzle.” Other numerical experiments explore the effect of time varying aggregation rate on the insurance premium.