Time and Intuition

Abstract

This chapter introduces the phenomenological possibility and condition of intuition. Among the Greeks, two kinds of intuition are obtainable. The first is non-rational intuition consisting of intimations of mystical essences that lie beyond ordinary cognition. Plato and Socrates are mostly concerned with this kind, with almost every dialogue touching upon the question of essences—of justice, goodness, language, and so on. Although the Platonic dialogues are every bit logical in their approach to the inquiry at hand, yet they are never very far from the spiritual dimension. Aristotle, on the other hand, looks to intuition or direct knowledge as the way in which empirical knowledge can be founded. But even here, nous (intuitive knowledge) is acknowledged as superior to empirical knowledge. The method of intuition is distinct from the method of science in that the latter attempts to piece together reality by apprehending the parts and making a mosaic out of the parts. Whereas intuition begins with the whole and finds meaning of the parts only in the context of the whole. For Kant, we cannot directly know or contact the world of nature. We construct our reality with the mental categories that are built into our perceptual schema. Kant dismisses the possibility of direct or intuitive knowledge. Consequently, Kant leaves us with more questions than answers. For example, nothing in the Kantian schema is able to solve the puzzle of the subject (consciousness) that contemplates or wonders about the nature of knowledge (world) itself, as we are doing just now. Going beyond Kant, is there a more adequate starting point of inquiry that helps us to directly grasp our relation to ourselves and the world?