Abstract
In his 2006 After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux presents a striking and far-reaching critique of what he calls correlationism: the view that there is no epistemological access to being as it is in itself, but only knowledge of being as it is for us. On the basis of his refutation of this doctrine, he comes to propose what he takes to be the fundamental principle of rational ontology: that there is no reason why things are the way they are, and they can change at any point, equally for no reason. “Time and Ground” argues that this principle of unreason elaborated by Meillassoux cannot be as fundamental as he claims, because all change and stasis presupposes a more profound temporal order.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
