Abstract

Occupancy information is one of the most important privacy issues of a home. Unfortunately, an attacker is able to detect occupancy from smart meter data. The current battery-based load hiding (BLH) methods cannot solve this problem. To thwart occupancy detection attacks, we propose a framework of battery-based schemes to prevent occupancy detection (BPOD). BPOD monitors the power consumption of a home and detects the occupancy in real time. According to the detection result, BPOD modifies those statistical metrics of power consumption, which highly correlate with the occupancy by charging or discharging a battery, creating a delusion that the home is always occupied. We evaluate BPOD in a simulation using several real-world smart meter datasets. Our experiment results show that BPOD effectively prevents the threshold-based and classifier-based occupancy detection attacks. Furthermore, BPOD is also able to prevent nonintrusive appliance load monitoring attacks (NILM) as a side-effect of thwarting detection attacks.

Highlights

  • Due to the development of information control and communication technologies, conventional power grids are being converted into smart grids

  • We make the following contributions: (i) We investigate the current occupancy detection attacks and based load hiding (BLH) methods and show that the BLH methods represented by Nonintrusive Load Leveling (NILL) and Lazy Stepping (LS) are unable to prevent occupancy detection attacks

  • We demonstrate that based schemes to prevent occupancy detection (BPOD) is able to prevent nonintrusive appliance load monitoring attacks (NILM) as a side-effect of preventing occupancy detection attacks

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Summary

Introduction

Due to the development of information control and communication technologies, conventional power grids are being converted into smart grids. To address the above problems, we propose a batterybased preventing occupancy detection method (BPOD), which enhances the external load to increase both true positives and false positives of occupancy detection attacks by charging the battery when the home is unoccupied and properly discharges the battery when the home is occupied. This method prevents occupancy detection attacks and protects other private information, such as appliance usage signatures, since the external load has been changed. We demonstrate that BPOD is able to prevent nonintrusive appliance load monitoring attacks (NILM) as a side-effect of preventing occupancy detection attacks

Background
Framework of BPOD
Experimental Evaluation
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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