Three Strategies of Presidential Policy Making: Politics and Policy in the Carter Administration

Abstract

Literature on presidential policy making has emphasized the tendency of presidents to centralize decision making authority in the White House or via a politicized bureaucracy However, given time and resource constraints, presidential priorities often are delegated to bureaucratic staffers bevond the control of political agents. Still other policy priorities are promulgated by mixing the efforts of White House staffers and bureaucratic agents. This research traces the political and substantive variables which impinge on presidential decisions to delegate or control policy making authority and the consequences of those decisions. Taking a presidential perspective, analysis of the Carter administration suggests that there are pros and cons, successes and failures, regardless of where policy making is focused. Policy decisions seem to reflect presidential preferences best when the White House asserts itself in policy decisions, but both the intensity and character of White House participation varies systematically across decision locations. Policy consequences thus are linked to the character of the decision process. The paper concludes with a discussion of theoretical, substantive, and methodological concerns regarding the study of presidential control of policy formation.