Abstract
AbstractBoth designers and users of social robots tend to anthropomorphize robots. Focusing on the question how to conceptualize the relation between robots and humans, this paper first outlines two opposite philosophical views regarding this relation, which are connected to various normative responses to anthropomorphism and anthropomorphization. Then it argues for a third view: navigating between what it calls “naïve instrumentalism” and “uncritical posthumanism”, it develops a hermeneutic, relational, and critical approach. Paradoxically, by unpacking the human dimension of robotics in its use and development, this view enables a critical discussion of anthropomorphizing robots. At the same time, and again somewhat paradoxically, it avoids a naïve instrumentalist position by taking robots’ role as an instrument in a larger con-technology seriously. As such, the third view questions the dualism assumed in the debate. The paper then explores what this means for the field of social robotics and the education of computer scientists and engineers. It proposes a reform based on a relational understanding of the field itself and offers suggestions for the role of users-citizens.
Highlights
Anthropomorphism and Anthropomorphization in Social RoboticsSocial roboticists develop robots that are meant to function more naturally in social situations than the machines from the past
With the help of literature from psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and other fields, researchers in social robotics and human–robot interaction (HRI) identify features that are deemed necessary for social interaction and these are implemented in the robot
Anthropomorphism does not seem to be necessary for social robotics; it may well suffice that the robot displays the characteristics mentioned above, without being human-like
Summary
Social roboticists develop robots that are meant to function more naturally in social situations than the machines from the past. According to the instrumentalist view, this magic and trickery of anthropomorphization is not problematic if the goal is achieved: if anthropomorphism of the robot and anthropomorphization by the users leads to a better human–robot interaction, and if this in turn achieves the goals humans wanted to achieve (e.g. a specific health care task), this trickery is allowed and even recommended This is again the instrumentalism at work. Another normative position is to use instrumentalism to argue that, regardless of the functioning and effectivity of the robot, it is highly problematic to anthropomorphize machines and to develop such machines in general and in principle because, so it is believed and asserted, robots are mere tools It is argued, social roboticists should stop designing them or at least make sure that users are aware that they are mere tools. What this means will become clear especially when I unpack the third position
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