Abstract
To get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of It o ^ ' s stochastic differential equation (SDE). Then, we discussed the impacts of incentive and penalty parameters on green credit. Through the above analysis, we got the following conclusions: (1) rewards and punishments always benefit green production and green credit, but increasing incentives is not conducive to the governments’ performance of regulatory duties; (2) punishments can better improve the convergence rate of players’ strategy than rewards; and (3) both rewards and punishments can exert an obvious effect in improving the changing degree of players’ strategy. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to optimize the green credit mechanism.
Highlights
Green credit means that financial institutions provide loan support and preferential treatment to the enterprises, which satisfy the national industrial policy and environmental protection standards, and restrict or refuse to lend to other enterprises with heavy pollution and high energy consumption
We construct a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model of local governments, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. e contribution of this study is reflected in the following two aspects: first, the three-party stochastic evolutionary game model is applied to the behavior research of green credit transaction subjects, and the sufficient conditions for the stability of subject strategy are given under uncertain environment; second, the impact of key parameters on the convergence rate and the changing degree of players’ strategy is comparatively analyzed by numerical simulation, and the effectiveness of reward and punishment mechanism is further discussed
We focus on the influence of the value change of incentive and penalty parameters on the evolution game results and attempt to evaluate their priority levels according to their influence degree. e variable assignment satisfies the sufficient condition of zero solution of equations (10)–(12) expectation moment exponentially stability
Summary
Green credit means that financial institutions provide loan support and preferential treatment to the enterprises, which satisfy the national industrial policy and environmental protection standards, and restrict or refuse to lend to other enterprises with heavy pollution and high energy consumption. E contribution of this study is reflected in the following two aspects: first, the three-party stochastic evolutionary game model is applied to the behavior research of green credit transaction subjects, and the sufficient conditions for the stability of subject strategy are given under uncertain environment; second, the impact of key parameters on the convergence rate and the changing degree of players’ strategy is comparatively analyzed by numerical simulation, and the effectiveness of reward and punishment mechanism is further discussed. Since 1 − x, 1 − y, and 1 − z are all nonnegative and will not affect the results of the evolutionary game, the replication dynamic equations of local government, bank, and loan enterprise are transformed into the following form [16]: dx xG +(1 − z)αT +(1 − y)(1 − z)cS − βP1dt, dy y(1 − z) R1 − R2 − F + D − (1 − z)βP2. − (1 − x)(1 − z)cSdt, dz zC1 − βP3 − (1 − y) R1 − R2 − (1 − x)αTdt
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