Abstract
Authenticated key agreements enable users to determine session keys, and to securely communicate with others over an insecure channel via the session keys. This study investigates the lower bounds on communications for three-party authenticated key agreements and considers whether or not the sub-keys for generating a session key can be revealed in the channel. Since two clients do not share any common secret key, they require the help of the server to authenticate their identities and exchange confidential and authenticated information over insecure networks. However, if the session key security is based on asymmetric cryptosystems, then revealing the sub-keys cannot compromise the session key. The clients can directly exchange the sub-keys and reduce the transmissions. In addition, authenticated key agreements were developed by using the derived results of the lower bounds on communications. Compared with related approaches, the proposed protocols had fewer transmissions and realized the lower bounds on communications.
Highlights
Authenticated key agreements (AKA) enable users to exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network, and to establish a common key that can be employed to encrypt all communications over an insecure channel
In an AKA protocol, each communicating entity that wants to determine session keys is assured of the identity of each of the others to provide mutual authentication
This study investigated the rules according to the behavior patterns of AKA protocol with explicit mutual authentication (AKA-Mutual Authentication (MA)) protocols, and derived the lower bounds of communications for 3AKA-MA protocols based on these rules
Summary
Authenticated key agreements (AKA) enable users to exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network, and to establish a common key that can be employed to encrypt all communications over an insecure channel. For protocol (i), by Rules 3 and 7, A cannot derive the session key SK until it receives a message that includes a sub-key K2 sent from B and transmitted by S. Proof: In a 3AKA-MA protocol, by Rule 1, the protocol originator A initiates a message including a sub-key K1 for generating a session key to the trusted server S in the first round. In related DH3AKA-MA protocols and the proposed DH-3AKA-MA protocols, session key security is based on the Diffie-Hellman problem, and clients can directly exchange their sub-keys. Gong0s 3AKA-MA protocol and the proposed 3AKA-MA protocols require five messages and four rounds These protocols realize the lower bounds on communications for 3AKA-MA protocols without revealing sub-keys in the channel. The proposed protocols involve fewer transmissions than other 3AKA-MA protocols, and realize the lower bounds on communications for 3AKA-MA protocols
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