Abstract

In this paper I examine the processes by which agencies of social control become organizationally corrupt, as one instance of the more general social problem of organizations adopting deviant goals. I define organizational corruption, and present three models of how it may develop: (1) the co-optation by social control agencies of the subjects of control; (2) the capture of social control agencies by external exploiters of the “power to regulate” as a marketable commodity; and (3) the domination of the agency by internal exploiters of the marketability of regulatory authority. I explore and illustrate the conditions under which each model is found and suggest some tasks for future theoretical work.

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