Abstract

The purpose of my dissertation is to identify factors driving corporate bond pricing and government guarantees on corporate liabilities. In the first manuscript, I identify the driving sources of asset growth from the perspective of debt financing and examine the asset growth effect on bond pricing. There are competing views on potential drivers for corporate asset growth. Researchers in favor of optimal investment attributes a higher asset growth rate to lower cost of capital and richer investment opportunities. Alternatively, the agency problem argument attributes high asset growth to over-investments. Building on that firms often heavily rely on debt to grow their assets, we differentiate these perspectives by studying the relation between the bond yields and issuers' asset growth rates. We do not find that yields of bonds issued by high asset growth firms are lower than those of low-growth firms. Moreover, we find that bonds issued by high asset growth firms are potentially overvalued - they experience poor performance in years afterwards. Overall, the results are aligned with the agency problem explanation for corporate asset growth. The second manuscript offers a novel approach to estimate the value of the implicit government guarantee by combining the contingent claim pricing with the likelihood of the government intervention. We find in our sample that the cost of this implicit protection can go beyond tens of billions of dollars with an average of about $13 million per company, per year, and it rises to about $24 million if the government is assumed to intervene with certainty. We then investigate the relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the funding costs of small and large banks. The funding costs for both small and large banks are related to the value of the implicit government guarantee. Moreover, we show that the spread of the funding costs of small banks over large banks is strongly associated with the value of the implicit government guarantee, especially after the crisis. The corporate bond sector has grown tremendously over the past decade. Rapid growth in Chinese corporate indebtedness and corporates ability to pay back their liabilities have become a persistent concern for regulators and investors in recent years. In the third manuscript, we examine the determinants of the pricing of Chinese corporate bonds and potential agency costs arising from implicit government guarantees (IGG) for state owned enterprises (SOEs). We show that the yield of central government SOE bonds is 85

Highlights

  • Firms differ substantially in their asset growth rates

  • We examine the determinants of the pricing of Chinese corporate bonds and potential agency costs arising from implicit government guarantees (IGG) for state owned enterprises (SOEs)

  • Our estimates support the Bloomberg View’s editorials, as we find that the value of the implicit government guarantee can go beyond billions of dollar for very big banks with trillions of dollars in assets and debts

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Summary

Introduction

The rapid growth in Chinese corporate indebtedness and corporates’ ability to pay back their liabilities have become a persistent concern for regulators and investors in recent years. The annual issuance of corporate debt in the amount of 4.3 trillion CNY as of the end of 2017, from 8.5 billion CNY in 20001 Of this total, about 28.6% are central government bonds, 53.5% are local government bonds, and the rest are non-state owned enterprise bonds. Investors considered bonds issued by stated owned enterprises in China’s domestic markets to have implicit guarantees. In 1984, state owned-enterprises (SOEs) were allowed to issue corporate bonds subject to the approval of the central bank. Investors considered bonds issued by stated owned enterprises in China’s domestic markets to have implicit guarantees by the government and were optimistic that the government would bail out systemically important enterprises when they are in financial distress. Since Tianwei’s default in 2015, several large SOEs have defaulted or restructured debt. The serial defaults of SOEs indicate that the absence of government guarantees of Tianwei is not an isolated event, and the fact that the Chinese government would never let state owned borrowers default has officially become history

Summary Statistics Panel A of
Asset Growth Decomposition
Determinants of the asset growth Q-theory of investment relates corporate investment to their cost of capital
Asset Growth Effects on Yield Spread Changes
Decomposition Results Explanation
Asset Growth and Bond Performance
Conclusion
D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 NG
From of Bloomberg View’s Editorials
Estimating the Probability of the Government Intervention (πi): Following
The Government Guarantee Data and Results
Funding Cost Measure
Agency Cost and SOEs
Empirical Results
Full Text
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