Three Concepts of Legitimacy

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to show that the concept of political legitimacy is rather more complex than is usually acknowledged. Specifically, it argues that in place of a single concept of legitimacy, three separate and independent concepts divide and accomplish the work standardly, but mistakenly assigned to one concept. The three concepts of legitimacy the chapter distinguishes can be mapped onto three different duties borne by agents who interact with a rightful political authority. The most familiar of these duties is the pro tanto duty citizens may have to obey the law. This duty can be distinguished from the citizenry’s duty not to interfere with—most basically, not to overthrow—the government. However, there are two versions of the duty not to interfere. In addition to the internal version borne by citizens, there is an external version borne by other states. In addition to being distinct, these three concepts of legitimacy are also ‘independent’. That is, the instantiation of one concept cannot be inferred from the instantiation of another. For example, to bring out the independence of the internal and external duties not to interfere with a rightful regime, the chapter appeals to the common intuition that citizens are sometimes permitted to revolt in cases where other states remain under a duty not to interfere. Its central illustration is a regimented version of justified resistance to a colonial power. In such cases, the colonial regime is internally illegitimate, but externally legitimate.