Three approaches to social unity and solidarity

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper reassesses theorizations of the basis of social unity in a polity, arguing that what I call the joint activity approach provides a more dynamic understanding of social unity as well as a more inclusive sense of solidarity. The paper begins by reconsidering the major alternatives in the history of political philosophy, as different views take different ties, bonds and relations as most fundamental to citizens’ sense of unity and togetherness in society. In view of this plurality, the paper first sets up a distinction between conceptions of social unity that are based on the existence of shared or common grounds such as national identity (Kymlicka, Tamir, Miller), identification with the institutions of a polity (Mason), patriotic identification with the constitution (Habermas) or an agreement on the principles of justice (Rawls) as the source of citizens’ sense of unity; and conceptions of social unity that rely on the joint and ongoing activities of citizens ―productive (Durkheim and Marx) and political (Aristotle)―as their basis. Second, the paper evaluates the implications of these different theoretical conceptualizations of social unity for the issue of social inclusion, integration and solidarity. It argues that the former conceptions are similarly limited in their capacity for inclusive solidarity since all of them focus on what citizens already share in common without paying sufficient attention to the production of what they take to be shared in society. The paper contributes to the growing literature on solidarity by bringing the widely neglected joint activity view back to the debate.