Thomas Reid’s Conception of Practical Ethics

Abstract

The article analyzes the concept of practical ethics in the moral philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710–1796). The significance of this study is determined by the fact that Reid, for the first time in the history of ethics, offers an internally differentiated conception of moral philosophy, which includes two parts: the theory of morality and practical ethics. The theory of morality studies the conditions for the possibility of morality (moral psychology and epistemology). Practical ethics is normative, deals directly with the content of morality (duties, rules, and first principles). Both parts of moral philosophy is cognitive in the nature. By distinguishing the theory of morality and practical ethics, Reid expresses a key idea for him: the distinction between good and evil and the fulfillment of duties is attainable to any reasonable person free from the influence of passions and prejudices. They do not need any special philosophical knowledge to fulfill their duty. Reid’s idea was perceived in contemporary ethics as a possible key for overcoming the difficulties that applied ethics faces today: (a) the problem of confirming its philosophical status; (b) the problem of the relevance of its guidelines, which are often perceived as abstract theorizing by specialists in specific fields. Reid showed that in morality, unlike other sciences such as anatomy, there can be no experts, and in order to be relevant, ethics must speak the same language with those to whom it addresses, and about those specific problems that are essential to them.