Thomas Nagel and the Competence–Performance Distinction

Abstract

It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer. I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philosophers would try to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear. – G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica NAGEL'S CRITICISMS OF RAWLS' LINGUISTIC ANALOGY Thomas Nagel's criticisms of Rawls' linguistic analogy may be found in his 1973 review of A Theory of Justice , “Rawls on Justice” (Nagel 1973). Nagel begins by summarizing Rawls' conception of moral theory in broad terms: Rawls believes that it will be more profitable to investigate the foundations of ethics when there are more substantive ethical results to seek the foundations of. […]