Abstract

The current study aims to investigate how the presence of social norms defines belief formation on future changes in social identity (i.e., diachronic identity), and how those beliefs affect individual decisions under uncertainty. The paper proposes a theoretical model in which individuals have preferences over their own attributes and over specific information structures. The individual preferences are motivated by the presence of social norms. The norms, while establishing the socially acceptable attributes of an individual identity, also drive individuals’ preferences for information acquisition or avoidance. The model incorporates social norms as empirical expectations and provides a prior dependent theory that allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. Firstly, the model implies that decisions are mitigated by socially grounded behavioral and cognitive biases; and secondly, that it can create an incentive to avoid information, even when the latter is useful, free, and independent of strategic considerations. These biases bring out individual trade-offs between the accuracy of decision making and self-image motivated by social conformity. The two behavioral motivations are represented through a game of an intra-personal model of choice under uncertainty in which self-deception and memory manipulation mechanisms are used to overcome the individuals’ internal trade-off.

Highlights

  • The standard assumption in economics is that decision makers (DMs) are endowed with perfect reflection

  • With the elements of sampling information and AU, this paper models how social norms and identity are linked from an intertemporal perspective that is different from Akerlof and Kranton’s [12,13]

  • What would be the distribution of the self-evaluation? Let us assume that σt = L is a signal reducing the self-image of the DM and that everyone will use the choose the same probability of recalling the signal, λ∗σ ∈ (0, 1), and they will impute the reliability of the memory by r ∗

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Summary

Introduction

The standard assumption in economics is that decision makers (DMs) are endowed with perfect reflection. The aversion for the information is analyzed in both cases of receiving good or bad signals, because both matter for the consequence of inefficient actions and self-esteem maintenance Their existence is determined by the presence of social norms that inform the DM in terms of the socially accepted identity and in how to respond to information conflicting with it. In contrast to existing work, this study first emphasizes the important role of social norms as underlying reasons for motivated beliefs (i.e., the demand side of self-deception), and second the necessity to generalize the selective recall strategy (i.e., the supply side of self-deception) This model tries to generalize the asymmetric recall strategy by proposing a thicker strategic input to the second result of Kószegi [16] in which he introduces the possibility of partial information acquisition.

Literature Review
On Diachronic Identity
On Social Norms
On Cognitive Dissonance
The Model
The DM’s Problem
Self-t Memory Manipulation Game
Discussion
Characterizing Beliefs Updating Heuristics
Welfare Analysis of Awareness
Conclusions
Full Text
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