Third-Party Punishment Mechanism and Corporate Cooperation in Environmental Investment: Experiments on Public Goods Game

Siying Lei,Liang Zhang,Ahmed Farouk,Yuling Liao,Wenkang Deng,Daofu Hu,Meizhe Song

doi:10.1155/2021/6192629

Siying Lei, Liang Zhang + Show 5 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6192629

Copy DOI

Abstract

In the context of corporate environmental investment (EI), this paper designs an experiment on public goods game without punishment and an experiment on that game with third-party punishment (TPP). Then, the influence of IEP and TPP mechanism on corporate EI behaviors was tested in details. The results show that different enterprises vary in IEP and took heterogenous behaviors in the two corporate EI experiments; the introduction of TPP pushed up the environmental resource investment of enterprises and increased the success rate of EI cooperation; IEP and TPP exerted a significantly positive influence on corporate EI behaviors; the introduction of TPP, coupled with the consideration of corporate IEP, can effectively elevate corporate EI and improve the eco-environment.

Highlights

While promoting economic growth, enterprises strain the carrying capacity of the eco-environment
Being the main source of environmental pollution, enterprises ought to shoulder the responsibility of environmental protection, step up environmental investment (EI), and actively promote the eco-environment [3, 4]
There is usually no penalty against corporate investment in environmental protection. e environmental protection is mainly supervised by regulatory departments of the government. erefore, this paper introduces a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism to EI, making the research more realistic

Summary

Introduction

Enterprises strain the carrying capacity of the eco-environment. Rough experiments on public goods game, Fehr and Gachter [6] found that the punishment mechanism makes people take actions that violate the traditional hypothesis of economic man. Public goods experiments have shown that the cooperation level under the TPP imposed by external subjects is higher than that under the second-party punishment [9]. Only handful scholars have studied the IEP together with the TPP, and very few have linked the two criteria with corporate EI behavior. To make up for the gap, this paper designs experiments on public goods game in the context of corporate EI, following experimental economics. En, the IEPs of all subjects were measured On this basis, the authors discussed the difference between enterprises in EI and the influence of the TPP on corporate cooperation in EI under the IEP

Experiment Design

Results’ Analysis

Findings

Regression Test