Thinking Honestly About Climate Change: Intergenerational Ethics and the Limits of Rationality.

Abstract

Recent papers in this journal add to widespread, increasingly urgent, calls for action to address the environmental and health consequences of climate change.1, 2 They draw attention to key facts which are now beyond dispute: climate change is primarily the result of human-generated emission; it has already generated major, sometimes disastrous, effects, to the extent that planetary health and maybe even the future of the species are now at risk; and while action to avoid a catastrophe remains possible, progress is too slow or non-existent. While it is generally – although not universally – agreed that there is a moral imperative to act, it is important to clarify the unique ethical challenges of intergenerational ethics and why we should take seriously moral obligations to subjects who do not yet exist. It is not merely sufficient to assert the moral importance of future generations, irrespective of how far in the future they might live, and that their interests must be taken into account in decisions made today. For while we may legitimately care deeply about the future of our planet and the world we leave to our children, why these concerns should override the responsibility to those alive today – particularly those who currently lack food, safe water, adequate shelter or employment – need to be justified. Equally, however, it does not seem right to make decisions now that are only in our interests and give no consideration to those of future generations. The question of what we owe future generations (or even whether we should take them into account in our decision-making) is genuinely difficult. This is because it overlaps complex, age-old ethical questions, such as what it is that makes a life worth living; it poses the impossible task of assessing the ‘value’ of lives and preferences of those who do not yet exist (and may never exist); and it challenges us to measure such theoretical future needs against the actual, tangible needs in the present. In addition to these philosophical conundrums, the social and political challenges are similarly daunting. Agreements about collective action for common present interests are hard enough to secure. Obtaining widespread consensus on a programme in which causes and effects are unclear and moral and sociopolitical agency are undefined will be even more formidable.3, 4 Sadly, none of the extant philosophical approaches to intergenerational ethics provides plausible guidance for such complex future decision-making.5 A completely satisfactory theory that allows us to articulate ethical concerns about the future and to identify solutions is not yet available.6,7 Nonetheless, we need to engage with the challenge of climate change as best we can. We need to think deeply about what is at stake, to identify what is reliably known and what remains uncertain, to reflect deeply on the impacts on future generations and to establish processes for decision-making that are at least evidence-informed, transparent, revisable and ethically defensible.