Abstract
This paper, submitted in connection with a panel at the 2012 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, explores some of the implications of regarding a constitution making exercise as not merely the enactment of a particularly important piece of legislation, but rather the establishment a broad and long lasting national compact. In a society such as Iraq, which is not only divided, but where different communities have radically different visions of an ideal state order, such high stakes can be impossible to manage. As such, one way to address the problem of constitution making in such contexts is to embrace ambiguity and deferral as means to reach consensus among sharply divided communities, thereby creating space for future (partial) resolution of existing disputes. This paper explores representative examples where such efforts have been undertaken in Iraq, and evaluates the extent to which they have been successful.
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