Thinking Beyond International Adjudication: Inspections as Instruments of Order Production in the International System

Abstract

Abstract This article focuses on international inspections, a means of international supervision and monitoring widely used in international law. It argues that to understand how order is produced in and across the international system, it is important to think beyond international adjudication for three reasons. First, the success of international law-making exercises, such as the negotiation of new treaties, is often measured by whether a compromissory clause is included in the agreed text. Such analyses overlook the fact that negotiating parties may choose other mechanisms to ensure compliance with, and implementation of, international norms. Second, not only are inspections often employed in international treaties alongside dispute settlement clauses and other treaty enforcement mechanisms, but – depending on their design – they may also function similarly to dispute settlement processes. Third, and most importantly, that international adjudication is based on state consent is often presented as an important safeguard of sovereignty and sovereign equality. Less often highlighted is the fact that such sovereignty (and sovereign equality) may be unsettled through a multitude of other processes – international inspections being a prime example.