Thinking about the nature of educational research: Going beyond superficial theoretical scripts

Abstract

This paper questions the idea that there are two opposing paradigms of educational research, often called positivist versus interpretivist. It argues that the ‘paradigm’ term has been used to avoid philosophical discussions about the nature of educational research. This has been done by understanding ‘paradigms’ to reflect metaphysical positions about connected epistemological and ontological assumptions. Problems with this conception of ‘paradigms’ are discussed including how to justify combining different research methods. The paper also criticises treating pragmatism as a ‘paradigm’ by distinguishing between everyday pragmatism and philosophical pragmatism. Philosophical pragmatism is presented as a diverse approach that is naturalistic, fallibilistic and overcoming of false dichotomies, that can risk leading to a self‐defeating relativism. How these have been addressed is then discussed. This has involved introducing some transcendental or impersonal elements into pragmatism without reverting to a metaphysical realism. This involves a discussion of various philosophical perspectives, pragmatic realism, evolutionary epistemology and critical realism, as relevant to educational research. The final section draws on a version of Dewey's pragmatist model of enquiry. informed by some of Habermas's early and later epistemological ideas as the basis for thinking about educational research that encompasses flexible and combined methodological approaches. The paper places research methodology in a central focus in educational research with its links to epistemology and methods. It concludes that pragmatist assumptions contribute to understanding educational research, its methodologies and the design of plural and flexible research methods, even if there are continuing philosophical investigations.