Think Like the Enemy: The Key to Preventing Another Gulf War

Abstract

On February 27, 1991, President George H.W. Bush addressed the nation from the Oval Office and delivered the news that many Americans were anxiously awaiting. “Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives are met.” This marked the end of the First Gulf War, a conflict between a US-led international coalition and Iraq. In the lead-up to the war, Iraq had invaded its oil-rich neighbor, Kuwait, in hopes of profiting from Kuwait’s oil fields. This marked a gross violation of Kuwait’s sovereignty and prompted the United States and its allies to embark on a military campaign to liberate Kuwait. After a month-long bombing offensive and four days of ground combat, the coalition successfully removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The coalition victory demonstrated the power of multilateralism and American military and diplomatic efforts. It reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to state sovereignty and to maintaining a steady flow of affordable oil from the Middle East. However, the risks such a war poses to citizens and soldiers should prompt a close analysis of why the war happened and what can be done to prevent similar conflicts in the first place. To fully understand the causes of the Gulf War, one must consider it from the perspective of the enemy — the perspective of Saddam Hussein. Hussein made significant miscalculations in spite of his vigilant approach to policy formation. His chief biographers recount how he was a man of outstanding acumen who never rushed to make a decision before considering all his options and “taking all the necessary precautions.” However, Hussein made two mistakes. He believed that the United States would not respond militarily to an invasion of Kuwait, and he trusted that Iraqi forces would triumph over the United States if war did erupt. To explain Hussein’s miscalculation of the United States’ position, one must look to the United States’ failure both to develop a clear policy on Iraq and to communicate that an invasion of Kuwait would be met with military force. To explain Hussein’s miscalculation of his own military strength, one must examine Hussein's lack of access to adequate advising and intelligence.