Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarisation. We argue that the transnational politics of CVE represents an extension of global militarism by some states, institutions, donors and brokers. CVE works to adapt global militarism and to reconfigure the global-local relationships that sustain it. We explore the roles and influence of local ‘CVE brokers’ in deradicalisation efforts in South-central Somalia. They inadvertently merge the counter-terrorism approach to Somali people, values and territory with non-military means. We show that their key practices – co-ordination, translation and alignment – advance, but also disrupt, alter and transform CVE policy objectives.

Highlights

  • This article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarism and militarisation

  • With the wave of reinvigorated IR research on global militarism in the post-9/11 security environment,[1] prominent works have drawn on these concepts in regard to security governance, interventions and war to discuss the roles of the great powers in justifying the sale or use of military hardware and discursive power in pursuit of counter-terrorism activities in Africa.[2]

  • We argue that the politics of CVE has enabled interveners, UN agencies and development partners to combine a wider spectrum of state-building, stabilisation and developmental practices other than those more directly coercive and weaponised options that dominated interventions in Somalia between 1991 and 2012

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Summary

Introduction

This article explores how societal actors in Somalia take part in a transnational politics of countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) through a political sociological approach to militarism and militarisation. Because there has been no system in place in Somalia to ensure a uniform CVE approach, diverse actors have ample space to appropriate, alter and transform CVE brokerage according to their beliefs, interests and immediate context.[60] The CVE agenda, empowers some actors more than others, notably the religious leaders on the ‘approved’ list, the clan elders most regularly consulted, certain government ministries and the civil society actors that receive grants Drawing together these activities with the aim of stopping al-Shabaab attributes military values to development-oriented youth empowerment schemes. When the presence of fewer CVE brokers among marginalised groups, for instance, intensifies clan politics over the resources that are introduced to the CVE scene, this could sow the seeds of future patterns of armed conflict, and further anchor informal militarised fighting strategies between communities.[83]

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