Abstract
Seven theses on the organisation of banking regulation derive from the systematic analysis of banking regulation actors: the organisation of banking regulation follows no legal foundation in the European Treaties (Sect. 4.1), the banking supervision by the European Central Bank is incompatible with their contractual mandate for monetary policy (Sect. 4.2), the European bank resolution leads to a communitarisation of liability (Sect. 4.3), the European banking regulation is incompatible with the determination of the German Basic Law for democratic legitimacy (Sect. 4.4) and banking supervision collides with the model of the Union law enforcement (Sect. 4.5). In addition, the density of regulation of the institutional framework affects the organisational power of the regulatory actors (Sect. 4.6) and the organisational power correlates with the influence of regulatory actors on decisions (Sect. 4.7). These issues will be presented graphically as well.
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