Abstract
For almost ten years international military historians have been discussing Terence Zuber's thesis of the Schlieffen Plan being just a myth designed by the German general staff after the First World War to cover up the mistakes committed by German generals in that war. This debate, led with particular ferocity in War and History, is based on German files that Zuber was the first to study. The following paper, however, challenges Zuber's theories on the basis of files and maps Zuber failed to consider. It seeks to prove that there was a basic operational-strategic doctrine — the Schlieffen Plan — and Schlieffen's successor stuck unwaveringly to it, although a few operational modifications were made. This doctrine was even implemented by the Wehrmacht in the Second World War, albeit in a modified version.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
