Abstract
Several have denied that there is, specifically, a criterion of identity for persons and some deny that there are, for any kind, diachronic criteria of identity. I argue, however, that there are no criteria of identity, either synchronic or diachronic, for any kind whatsoever (and could be none). I begin by elaborating the notion of a criterion of identity in order to clarify what exactly is being denied when I maintain there are none. I examine the motivation of those who qualify in some way the general claim that there are synchronic and diachronic criteria of identity for every kind, then present my direct and categorical argument against such criteria. I next evaluate the objections of those who argue that rejecting criteria of identity has untenable results. These objections are ineffective, each based on the incorrect assumption that if there is no criterion of identity for a kind, the identity of an instance of that kind is independent of its qualities. I conclude by considering some of the upshots of rejecting criteria of identity and the insight doing so provides into things in general and the limits of ontological inquiry.
Highlights
A criterion of identity is a putative ontological principle that is supposed to account for the identity of a thing
There are supposed to be synchronic criteria of identity, which are to account for the existence of a thing at a single moment, and diachronic criteria, which are to account for the continued existence of a thing from one moment to another
I evaluate the objections of those who argue that rejecting such criteria has untenable results. These objections are ineffective, each based on the incorrect assumption that if there is no criterion of identity for a kind, the identity of an instance of that kind is independent of its qualities
Summary
A criterion of identity is a putative ontological principle that is supposed to account for the identity of a thing. The issue of how things in general persist is thought to be resolvable by determining a (diachronic) criterion of identity for temporal entities. Underlying these discussions (and others) is the presumption that the identity of things—at a moment or over time—is explicable, that there is some illuminating account of what makes a thing itself. I evaluate the objections of those who argue that rejecting such criteria has untenable results These objections are ineffective, each based on the incorrect assumption that if there is no criterion of identity for a kind, the identity of an instance of that kind is independent of its qualities. I conclude by considering some of the upshots of primitivism for certain metaphysical discussions and the insight the position provides into things in general and the limits of ontological inquiry
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