Abstract

In modern Russian legal literature, the concept of single legal responsibility is very popular, which its creators position as a truly scientific theory. This concept contrasts itself with the private scientific theory of legal responsibility existing in Russian legal science, competing with the latter in terms of understanding and interpreting legal responsibility. The external similarity of the concept of single legal responsibility with a scientific theory can mislead researchers (especially beginners), as a result of which they recognize this concept as a form of scientific knowledge and accept its provisions on faith. The article provides a critical analysis of the numerous interpretations of the concept of legal responsibility contained in the concept and defines the epistemological status of the concept. The study revealed in the concept of single legal responsibility a number of non-normative for science in general and legal science in particular, schemes of reasoning, methods of argumentation and principles for constructing a presentation, as well as a purely specific categorical apparatus. The involved toolkit for the logical and epistemological assessment of the provisions of scientific theoretical concepts, including such institutional determinants of scientific character and markers of scientific knowledge as logical integrity, scientific normativity, consistency of inferences and the generally acceptedterminology used, made it possible to substantiate the conclusion about belonging the concept of a single legal responsibility to forms of unscientifi c knowledge and qualify it as a pseudo-scientifi c theoretical construction.

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