Abstract
This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.
Highlights
This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights
As is clear from the previous text, it is possible to raise a number of fundamental arguments against the theory of basic needs
We need to assess the theory of basic needs in the proper context, and it is true that the notion that the rights are here to protect our needs is probably much more intelligible to most people than, for instance, the idea that these rights protect our normative agency
Summary
There is no doubt that human rights are currently an extremely influential concept. If governments today commit cruel or unjust actions, we refer to violations of human rights, rather than that they are unjust, immoral, or barbaric (Nickel, 2007: 1; Kysela, 2014: 258). The idea that needs-based justification is capable of establishing human rights objectively and universally is currently proposed by, for example, David Miller (2017: 179; 2012: 410 – 411), Rita Floyd (2011: 103), and Massimo Renzo (Renzo, 2015: 572). The greatest attention will be paid to the most serious and most illustrative attempts recently made in connecting theories of needs and rights, which are the conceptions of David Miller and Massimo Renzo. This objective corresponds with the very structure of the paper. If we renounce the universal dimension of these rights, needs can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts
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