Theory and Practice in Law

Abstract

Lawis characterised by a fundamental gap between its social embeddedness and theapparently formal automatism it operates, which gap is basically bridged by thelaw's ultimate practicality under the guise of its mere logicity. This seemingcontradiction is resolved by judicial decisions as responsible and responsivepractical actions which are to result from the necessary conceptualtransformation(s) of the law's wording in the course of its officialapplication, which does involve a necessary jump in logical derivation. This isto say that on final analysis and inpractical terms, law is what gets actualised through the actual uses of it. Black-box effect such as this is helped by thevariety-and owing to the magical transforming effects-of legal techniques.Eventually, it is legal culture that provides a medium in which legaltechniques can at all be selected and used. On a conceptual plane, one of thefilters is offered by legal dogmatics. This very complex includes dialectics aswell, for there is no motion without counter-motion, therefore, it is notrealistic to pursue any human ambition without some safety valves inserted. Or,regarding, e.g., law, no homo­genisationis feasible without some re-heterogenisation at the same time. Paradoxicallyspeaking, while modern formal legal development went in the direction tomechanise the judge, the realisation was also made that law had ever been tooserious an undertaking to be just left alone to the logification by someimpersonally formalistic apparatus. Therefore, simultaneously with the veryfirst act of formalisation, law has ever built in its scheme the possibility ofde-formalisation as well.