Abstract

The perplexing relationship between two of the twentieth century’s most important philosophers, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, has been the subject of much speculation within academic circles. For Arendt, Heidegger was, at once, her mentor, her lover, and her friend. In this paper, we juxtapose Arendt’s theory of the banality of evil against her relationship with Heidegger in an effort to consider the question of how theorizing is a corporeal process. Specifically, while the banality of evil is a theory that is conventionally attributed to Arendt’s analysis of Adolf Eichmann-during his trial for the crimes that he perpetrated in the operation of the Holocaust-we argue that the theory is, more compellingly, reflective of Arendt’s deeply personal attempts at making sense of Heidegger’s decision to affiliate himself with the German Nazi Party in the years preceding, and during, the Second World War. Through this revisionist account of the banality of evil, we animate the idea that theorizing is the discursive corollary, and belongs within the parameters, of corporeality. Finally, we contend that a holistic understanding of how corporeality informs theorizing will only be realized in the field of organization studies, when there is a collapsing of the seemingly impervious boundaries between ontology and epistemology.

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