Theories, Perturbations, and Testability: Commentary on Fourie

Abstract

David Fourie has written a provocative and interesting article in which he argues that systemic hypnosis is qualitatively different than an Ericksonian conception and approach to hypnosis. He proceeds to demonstrate these differences with a description of systemic hypnosis via the use of anecdotes. In his exposition, he lays out a number of assumptions that underpin his argument. These assumptions are problematic and, as such, warrant closer scrutiny. Prior to considering Fourie’s argument for systemic hypnosis rather than an “Ericksonian” approach to hypnosis, we will need to consider the key notions of “objectivity,” “causality,” “perturbations,” “reality,” and notion of refutatbility in science. Fourie notes that by the early 1980’s systems thinking had moved from first order to second order cybernetics “. . .moving away from the focus on interaction pattern in families, as if these could be objectively (italics added) observed, toward a consideration of the functioning of systems as wholes.” He goes on to note that these second order systems can only do what its structure allows it to do and no causal influence of one system on another is possible. “Systems can only “perturb” one another and the reaction to this perturbation is determined by the structure of the perturbed system, not by actions of the perturbing system.” Concluding his summary of the basic tenets of second order thinking, Fourie goes on to say, “The behavior of systems can not be objectively observed, because by observing, the observer becomes part of the system and the observation is therefore cooperatively constructed by all the members of the system.” He cites the social constructivists, Von Foerster, Von Glasersfeld, Maturana, and Varela et al.