Abstract
Normative theorists of corruption have developed an institutional conception that is distinct from both the individualist approaches focused on quid pro quo exchanges and other institutional approaches found in the literature on developing societies. These theorists emphasize the close connection between patterns of corruption and the legitimate functions of institutions. The corruption benefits the institution while undermining it. Reforms therefore should be directed toward finding alternatives for the functions the corruption serves. Also, institutional corruption does not require that its perpetrators have corrupt motives, and it is not limited to political institutions. This review examines four leading theories and discusses criticisms of their approach. A tripartite framework for analyzing the elements of institutional corruption is proposed. Although the theories are useful for distinguishing institutional corruption from the more familiar forms of individual corruption, they could be enriched by giving greater attention to the work on individual corruption in its structural forms in developing societies.
Highlights
The study of institutional corruption has taken a new turn in recent years as theorists have developed a conception that differs from that of conventional corruption in both its individual and structural forms (Thompson 1995; Warren 2004; Miller 2010, 2017; Lessig 2011)
Institutional corruption does not require that its perpetrators have corrupt motives, and it is not limited to political institutions
The theories are useful for distinguishing institutional corruption from the more familiar forms of individual corruption, they could be enriched by giving greater attention to the work on individual corruption in its structural forms in developing societies
Summary
The study of institutional corruption has taken a new turn in recent years as theorists have developed a conception that differs from that of conventional corruption in both its individual and structural forms (Thompson 1995; Warren 2004; Miller 2010, 2017; Lessig 2011). The major difference from Thompson and most other institutionalists is that Miller holds that institutional corruption typically requires a corrupt individual agent.
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