Theories of false memory in children and adults

Abstract

Much attention has recently been paid to false-memory effects in children and adults. Attention initially focused on the effects themselves. Most observers now agree that false-memory effects are robust and replicable, although they are subject to constraints (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Reyna & Titcomb 1997; Zaragoza & Lane 1994; Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil & Chambers 1997). Using noncoercive procedures, it is possible to induce people to falsely remember witnessing events that they never experienced (e.g., that they saw a yield sign, rather than a stop sign; Loftus 1979; Loftus, Miller & Burns 1978). Currently, researchers are beginning to examine the origins of such effects: How are false memories created, and what can be done to minimize them? It has become apparent that the key questions of prediction and prevention must be addressed through theory development, i.e., by deepening our understanding of false-memory phenomena. In this article, we explore contemporary explanations for false-memory effects in children and adults, including constructivism, source monitoring, and fuzzy-trace theory. Our discussion is divided into four sections. In the first section, we briefly review the assumptions underlying different theoretical approaches. In the second section, various false-memory effects are described, and their interactions with age, delay, and type of questioning. Laboratory demonstrations of false memories are supplemented by real-life examples from clinical medicine. Then, we examine how each of these effects is explained from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, we take stock of the available evidence favoring different explanations for false-memory effects, and discuss the implications of that evidence for subsequent theorizing and for improving memory performance.