Abstract

In his dense, rich, and sophisticated book, Robert Pasnau presents, interprets, and discusses in a systematic way central aspects of the debate about theories of cognition between 1250 and 1350. The focus is primarily on pre-propositional items which are required for composing propositions: items that represent features of the world or essences of things. These items are called by the technical word ‘species’. The main questions of the book are whether a theory of cognition that assumes species can still be a version of direct realism, whether such a theory fosters scepticism, and whether the assumption of species is required at all in a theory of cognition. Thomas Aquinas is taken as the representative of a species-theorist of cognition, Peter John Olivi and William Ockham as its challengers. Some other medieval figures turn up as well, for example, Roger Bacon, Henry of Ghent, Peter Aureol, and William Crathorn. The book is divided into an introduction, a first part, headed ‘Fundamentals’, a second and principal part, headed ‘Representations and Realism’, a conclusion, and two appendices: one on Aquinas’ thesis about the identity of cognizer and cognized object, the other one on Henry of Ghent’s view of intelligible species.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call