Abstract
Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.
Highlights
As Robert Richards has shown, there are at least three main theoretical positions within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, which provides mechanical explanations of animal behavior, (ii) Reimarus’ theory1 3 Vol.:(0123456789) 37 Page 2 of 35H. van den Berg of instincts, which posits innate instincts to explain animal behavior, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy, a mentalist position which attributes reason or intelligence to animals (Richards 1979, 1987)
A full account of the theoretical reasons for espousing different theories on animal cognition in the eighteenth century needs to consider these theoretical virtues. This does not mean that Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy only appealed to theoretical virtues to justify their positions
5 I discuss the views of Leroy and Condillac and show which theoretical virtues justified their attribution of reason or intelligence to animals
Summary
H. van den Berg of instincts, which posits innate instincts to explain animal behavior, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy, a mentalist position which attributes reason or intelligence to animals (Richards 1979, 1987). I will argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective positions, we must pay attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. A full account of the theoretical reasons for espousing different theories on animal cognition in the eighteenth century needs to consider these theoretical virtues This does not mean that Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy only appealed to theoretical virtues to justify their positions. After having identified and historicized the theoretical virtues, I will analyze the texts of Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy in order to verify
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
