Theoretical typology of deceptive content (Conspiracy Theories)

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Practical recommendations to communicate with patients about health‐related conspiracy theories

At the time of writing, nearly one hundred published studies demonstrate that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and misinformation are negatively associated with COVID-19 preventive behaviors. These correlational findings are often interpreted as evidence that beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation are exogenous factors that shape human behavior, such as forgoing vaccination. This interpretation has motivated researchers to develop methods for “prebunking,” “debunking,” or otherwise limiting the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation online. However, the robust literatures on conspiracy theory beliefs, health behaviors, and media effects lead us to question whether beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation should be treated as exogenous to vaccine hesitancy and refusal. Employing U.S. survey data (n = 2,065) from July 2021, we show that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and misinformation are not only related to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal, but also strongly associated with the same psychological, social, and political motivations theorized to drive COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal. These findings suggest that beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation might not always be an exogenous cause, but rather a manifestation of the same factors that lead to vaccine hesitancy and refusal. We conclude by encouraging researchers to carefully consider modeling choices and imploring practitioners to refocus on the worldviews, personality traits, and political orientations that underlie both health-related behaviors and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, conspiracy theories about the virus spread rapidly, and whilst governments across the globe put in place different restrictions and guidelines to contain the pandemic, these were not universally adhered to. This research examined the association between pandemic related risk perceptions, belief in conspiracy theories, and compliance with COVID-19 public guidelines amongst a UK sample (n = 368). Participants rated their level of concern for a series of potential risks during the pandemic (to the economy, personal health, freedom, media integrity and health risk to others). Participants also rated their level of belief in different conspiracy theories and self-reported their behaviour during the first UK lockdown. Mediational analyses showed that stronger belief in conspiracy theories was associated with perceptions of lower risk to health and higher risk to the economy and freedom, which in turn were associated with lower compliance with COVID-19 related governmental guidelines. Perception of information transparency risks did not mediate the association between belief in conspiracy theories and compliant behaviours. These results highlight the key role that risk perception may play in translating belief in conspiracy theories into low compliance with governmental COVID-19 related guidelines. Our findings suggest new patterns with respect to the relationship between conspiracy theory adherence and salience of different risk perceptions amidst the pandemic, which could have implications for the development of public health messaging and communication interventions.

Belief in COVID-19 related conspiracy theories around the globe: A systematic review

A substantial minority of the public express belief in conspiracy theories. A robust phenomenon in this area is that people who believe one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others. But the reason for this "positive manifold" of belief in conspiracy theories is unclear. One possibility is that a single underlying latent factor (e.g. "conspiracism") causes variation in belief in specific conspiracy theories. Another possibility is that beliefs in various conspiracy theories support one another in a mutually reinforcing network of beliefs (the "monological belief system" theory). While the monological theory has been influential in the literature, the fact that it can be operationalised as a statistical network model has not previously been recognised. In this study, we therefore tested both the unidimensional factor model and a network model. Participants were 1553 American adults recruited via Prolific. Belief in conspiracies was measured using an adapted version of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory. The fit of the two competing models was evaluated both by using van Bork et al.'s (Psychometrika, 83, 2018, 443, Multivariate Behavioral Research, 56, 2019, 175) method for testing network versus unidimensional factor models, as well as by evaluating goodness of fit to the sample covariance matrix. In both cases, evaluation of fit according to our pre-registered inferential criteria favoured the network model.

Conspiracy Theories, Mistrust Take Root During Pandemic

Predictors of belief in conspiracy theory: The role of individual differences in schizotypal traits, paranormal beliefs, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality

An important component of conspiracy theories is how they influence, and are influenced by, the evaluation of potential evidence. Some individuals may be more open minded regarding certain explanations for events whereas others may seek closure and thus cut off a conspiracy explanation. Two studies examined the relationship between the need for cognitive closure (NFCC), levels of belief in real world conspiracy theories, and the attribution of conspiracy theories to explain events. A first, small (N = 30) and preliminary study found no relationship between NFCC and beliefs in conspiracy theories, suggesting that both advocates and opponents of conspiracy explanations do not differ on this dimension. A second study (N = 86) revealed that evidence for and against conspiracy theories had an influence on attributions of the likelihood of a conspiracy to explain a novel event. Specifically, after reading evidence individuals with high levels of belief in conspiracy theories tended to rate a conspiracy explanation as more likely whereas those with low levels of belief rated it as less likely. However, when the need for cognitive closure (NFCC) was experimentally lowered the effects of prior beliefs in conspiracy theories diminished.

Part I Definitions and approaches Introduction Todor Hristov, Andrew McKenzie-McHarg and Alejandro Romero Reche 1. Conceptual history and conspiracy theory Andrew McKenzie-McHarg 2. Conspiracy theory in historical, cultural and literary studies Peter Knight and Michael Butter 3. Semiotic Approaches to Conspiracy Theories Massimo Leone, Mari-Liis Madison and Andreas Ventsel 4. Philosophy and conspiracy theories Juha Raikka and Juho Ritola 5. Psychoanalysis, critical theory and conspiracy theory Nebojsa Blanusa and Todor Hristov 6. Conspiracy theory as occult cosmology in anthropology Annika Rabo 7. Sociology, social theory and conspiracy theory Turkay Salim Nefes and Alejandro Romero Reche 8. Conspiracy theories in political science and political theory Julien Giry and Pranvera Tika 9. Social psychology of conspiracy theory Olivier Klein and Kenzo Nera 10. Social network analysis, social big data and conspiracy theories Estrella Gualda Caballero Part II Psychological factors Introduction Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Karen Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Michal Bilewicz 1. Personality traits, cognitive styles and worldviews associated with beliefs in conspiracy theories Anthony Lantian, Michael Wood and Biljana Gjoneska 2. Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Olivier Klein and Jasna Milosevic Dordevicz 3. Motivations, emotions and belief in conspiracy theories Karen M. Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Robbie M. Sutton 4. Conspiracy theories as psycho-political reactions to perceived power Roland Imhoff and Pia Lamberty 5. How conspiracy theories spread Adrian Bangerter, Pascal Wagner-Egger and Sylvain Delouvee 6. Conspiracy theories and intergroup relations Mikey Biddlestone, Aleksandra Cichocka, Iris Zezelj and Michal Bilewicz 7. Consequences of conspiracy theories Daniel Jolley, Silvia Mari and Karen Douglas 8. Countering conspiracy theories and misinformation Peter Kreko Part III Society and politics Introduction Eirikur Bergmann, Asbjorn Dyrendal, Jaron Harambam and Hulda Thorisdottir 1. Who are the conspiracy theorists? Demographics and conspiracy theories Steven M. Smallpage, Hugo Drochon, Joseph E. Uscinski and Casey Klofstad 2. Conspiracy theory entrepreneurs, movements and individuals Jaron Harambam 3. Conspiracy theories and gender and sexuality Annika Thiem 4. Conspiracy theories, political ideology and political behaviour Hulda Thorisdottir, Silvia Mari and Andre Krouwel 5. Functions and uses of conspiracy theories in authoritarian regimes Julien Giry and Dogan Gurpinar 6. Conspiracy theory and populism Eirikur Bergman and Michael Butter 7. Radicalisation and conspiracy theories Benjamin Lee 8. Antisemitism and conspiracism Kjetil Braut Simonsen 9. Conspiracy theory and religion Asbjorn Dyrendal Part IV Media and transmission Introduction Stef Aupers, Dana Craciun and Andreas OEnnerfors 1. Rumours, urban legends and the verbal transmission of conspiracy theories Anastasiya Astapova 2. Conspiracy theorising and the history of media in the eighteenth century Andrew McKenzie-McHarg and Claus Oberhauser 3. Genres of conspiracy in nineteenth-century British writing Ben Carver 4. Conspiracy in American narrative Timothy Melley 5. Conspiracy theories and visual culture Ute Caumanns and Andreas OEnnerfors 6. Conspiracy theories in film and television shows Michael Butter 7. Decoding mass media / encoding conspiracy theory Stef Aupers 8. The Internet and the spread of conspiracy content Simona Stano 9. Networked disinformation and the lifecycle of online conspiracy theories Hugo Leal 10. Conspiracy theories and fake news Kiril Avramov, Vasily Gatov and Ilya Yablokov Part V Histories and regions Introduction Ilya Yablokov, Pascal Girard, Nebojsa Blanusa and Annika Rabo 1. Conspiracy theories in the Roman empire Victoria Emma Pagan 2. Conspiracy theories in the Middle Ages and the early modern period Cornel Zwierlein 3. Freemasons, Illuminati and Jews: Conspiracy theories and the French Revolution Claus Oberhauser 4. Conspiracy Theories in Europe during the twentieth century Pascal Girard 5. Conspiracy theories in Putin's Russia: the case of the 'New World Order' Ilya Yablokov 6. Conspiracy theories in and about the Balkans Nebojsa Blanusa 7. Conspiracy theories in Turkey Dogan Gurpinar and Turkay Salim Nefes 8. Conspiracy theories in the Middle East Matthew Gray 9. Conspiracy theories in Southeast Asia Viren Swami, Hanoor Syahirah Zahari and David Barron 10. Conspiracy theories in American history Michael Butter 11. Populism and conspiracy theory in Latin America: a case study of Venezuela Rosanne Norris Hooper

Conspiracies happen, and some conspiracy theories are warranted by evidence. Nevertheless, a non-trivial proportion of the public express belief in conspiracy theories that are not warranted by evidence. Psychological research has therefore investigated the motives that might lead someone to believe a conspiracy theory even where the available evidence for the theory is weak. Two potential causes that have been proposed in the literature and embedded in theorising are psychological stress and anxiety. Prior studies have provided some evidence that stress and anxiety are positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories, but it remains unclear whether this apparent effect might be accounted for by plausible confounding variables. Furthermore, there have been few preregistered examinations of the proposed effects of stress and anxiety, rendering it unclear to what degree this proposition has yet been subjected to a severe test. In two preregistered cross-sectional survey studies, we tested whether higher perceived stress and anxiety significantly predicted belief in conspiracy theories while controlling for plausible confounding variables (age, education, subjective social status, and political orientation). We analysed data using structural equation models, allowing measurement error to be explicitly modelled and accounted for. In Study 1 (N =502), a cross-sectional survey of Australasian participants indicated that perceived stress and anxiety did not have significant estimated effects on belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N =1020), a cross-sectional survey of US participants showed a small significant positive effect of perceived stress, but not anxiety, on belief in conspiracy theories. The present results provide very tentative evidence for an effect of perceived stress on belief in conspiracy theories. However, it is increasingly evident that this effect, if it exists at all, is not large.

BackgroundThe belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation are often treated as almost synonymous. However, there is to date no research concerning shared underlying cognitive underpinnings of belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation. One potential underlying factor could be the well-known jumping to conclusion (JTC) bias, the tendency of persons with delusions to perform hasty decisions that are sometimes based on little evidence. Furthermore, a preference for a more intuitive general thinking style, as opposed to an analytical thinking style, could be an additional underlying cognitive factor of both conspiracy theories and paranoia. Thus, the aim of the present study is to investigate in a large sample of non-clinical individuals whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in individuals who display a stronger belief in conspiracy theories and whether both are related to a more intuitive thinking preference.MethodsWe assessed the data of 519 non-clinical individuals regarding their respective approval of 20 specific conspiracy theories in an online study. Further, we assessed the JTC-bias by using a computerized variant of the beads task (fish task). Thinking preferences were measured with the Rational-Experiential Interview.ResultsSubjects who displayed the JTC-bias presented a more pronounced belief in conspiracy theories. In addition, gathering little information in the fish task before performing a decision (less draws to decision) was related to a stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories and a more intuitive thinking style (and a less analytic thinking style). Finally, a preference for intuitive thinking predicted a stronger belief in conspiracy theories in a multiple regression analysis.ConclusionsOur results demonstrate the implication of a preference for an intuitive thinking style accompanied by a propensity to faster decision-making (JTC-bias) as possible cognitive underpinnings of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Furthermore, our study is the first to confirm the notion of the JTC-bias as a reflection of the use of an intuitive thinking style.

Conspiracies happen, and some conspiracy theories are warranted by evidence. Nevertheless, a non-trivial proportion of the public express belief in conspiracy theories that are not warranted by evidence. Psychological research has therefore investigated the motives that might lead someone to believe a conspiracy theory even where the available evidence for the theory is weak. Two potential causes that have been proposed in the literature and embedded in theorising are psychological stress and anxiety. Prior studies have provided some evidence that stress and anxiety are positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories, but it remains unclear whether this apparent effect might be accounted for by plausible confounding variables. Furthermore, there have been few preregistered examinations of the proposed effects of stress and anxiety, rendering it unclear to what degree this proposition has yet been subjected to a severe test. In two preregistered cross-sectional survey studies, we tested whether higher perceived stress and anxiety significantly predicted belief in conspiracy theories while controlling for plausible confounding variables (age, education, subjective social status, and political orientation). We analysed data using structural equation models, allowing measurement error to be explicitly modelled and accounted for. In Study 1 (N =502), a cross-sectional survey of Australasian participants indicated that perceived stress and anxiety did not have significant estimated effects on belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N =1020), a cross-sectional survey of US participants showed a small significant positive effect of perceived stress, but not anxiety, on belief in conspiracy theories. The present results provide very tentative evidence for an effect of perceived stress on belief in conspiracy theories. However, it is increasingly evident that this effect, if it exists at all, is not large.

A conspiracy theory refers to an alternative explanation of an event involving a conspirator plot organised by powerful people or organisations. Belief in conspiracy theories is related to negative societal outcomes such as poor medical decisions and a decrease in prosocial behaviour. Given these negative outcomes, researchers have explored predictors of belief in conspiracy theories in an attempt to understand and possibly manage these beliefs. In the current study, we explored the utility of personality in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. The aim of the current study was to explore the utility of the odd beliefs/magical thinking subtype of schizotypy, Machiavellianism, grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, primary psychopathy, and secondary psychopathy in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. Participants (N = 230; 44.7% male, 55.3% female) completed an anonymous, confidential online questionnaire which comprised demographics and measures of personality traits and belief in conspiracy theories. The total regression model indicated odd beliefs/magical thinking, trait Machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy were significant, positive predictors of belief in conspiracy theories. No other predictors reached significance. Results of the current study highlight individuals who might be more susceptible to believing conspiracy theories. Specifically, these results indicate that the individual more likely to believe in conspiracy theories may have unusual patterns of thinking and cognitions, be strategic and manipulative, and display interpersonal and affective deficits.

This chapter explores the link between conspiracy theories, political beliefs and political engagement in order to answer the question of whether conspiracy theories can be viewed as a vehicle for the outsider to articulate their doubts about governments and ruling powers. It examines whether belief in conspiracy theories is linked with a discernible profile of political engagement and participation. Conspiracy theories can serve as a psychological tool for the political outsider to regain a sense of control and increase predictability because they offer an explanation for events that the official account attributes to coincidences, natural forces or a series or random events. There is limited research on the relationship between belief in political conspiracy theories and political participation. Statistical analysis showed no relationship between political ideology and either the Conspiracy mentality questionnaire or belief in specific conspiracy theories. Among people low on political interest, conspiracy theories may further solidify their distaste, lack of trust and alienation from the political process.