Abstract
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the book, and develops the hypotheses to be tested. It argues that the attitudes of MPs to party unity will be shaped by the career, electoral, and other political incentives they face, and so reflect the extent to which MPs’ experiences of the expectation to maintain party unity is positive or negative. It then develops three measurements of policy incentives to dissent in floor votes in multiparty legislatures, each corresponding to a different assumption about how MPs approach floor voting. Further, the chapter discusses the case selection and the quality of the data used in the book.
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