Theoretical Foundations of the Dependent Monetary Regimes

Abstract

The purpose of the present article is to present a comprehensive framework to analyse main characteristics and institutional forms of the dependent monetary regimes. A country’s monetary regime is an extension of its geopolitical and geo-economic place in the international system. The dynamic monetary dependence/independence of a particular country is a direct continuation of, as well as ‘serving’, the (geo) political and economic dependence/independence of that country. That dependence does not mean that small countries do not benefit from this type of monetary and political regimes; on the contrary – in most cases it is the most appropriate, so to speak, “optimal” form which, if skilfully managed, minimises losses under a given external structural constraint. As a rule, in dependent countries, external sources of money supply dominate domestic sources. Peripheral and dependent countries cannot borrow on international markets in their own national currencies. They borrow in major world currencies and become vulnerable to currency (exchange rate) risk. The inflow of external capital, in turn, requires a corresponding stable institutional and political environment. Therefore, the external equilibrium (external stability), i.e., the state of the balance of payments and especially its financial (capital) account, as well as the dynamics of the exchange rate, become central parameters for the development of the peripheral countries. It is interesting to add that the imposition of a dependent regime in small and peripheral countries is accompanied by the imposition and dissemination of economic views, theories and ideas (“economic narrative”), which legitimise this new monetary regime and prepare the imposition of a certain economic development model.