Theoretical explanations of developmental reversals in memory and reasoning

Abstract

Developmental reversals are puzzling situations in which cognitive development seems to be devolving rather than evolving because reasoning and memory become more illogical and biased with age. The theoretical conundrum is to explain how underlying processes that mature in the normal way could nevertheless cause specific forms of reasoning and memory to seem to devolve. Currently, there are several competing explanations, which can be divided into two broad categories: (a) an explanation that actually predicted several developmental reversals before they were identified empirically and (b) several other explanations that attempt to account for reversals after the fact. Concerning a, fuzzy-trace theory predicted developmental reversals for certain reasoning illusions (e.g., decision framing, conjunction fallacies) and memory illusions (e.g., false memory paradigms) that had been extensively studied in adults. The key idea was that illusions in both domains derive from an ability that develops slowly, the tendency to rely on semantic gist. This explanation has stimulated a substantial research literature, which includes critical tests of its predictions. Concerning b, the alternative explanations can be grouped into major accounts and minor accounts. The major alternatives (the developmental deficit and associative network hypotheses) have generated substantial research, but neither explains the full range of developmental reversals. The minor alternatives (the working-memory capacity, item and relational encoding, recollection and familiarity, and perceptual and conceptual style hypotheses) have generated only limited research, and they also do not explain the full range of developmental reversals.