Theorems to explore the nature of cyber attacks on power system voltage stability

Abstract

Abstract Smart electric grids are practising flexible, reliable and robust operations during delivery and consumption of power. However, these grids are highly vulnerable to a wide range of cyber attacks due to the deployment of an extensive communication network. In this paper, the nature of cyber attack on given power system based on proposed cyber attack models and theorems is analysed by utilizing steady state voltage stability (L index). Further, a cyber attack factor is introduced which may mislead the bus voltage stability virtually. The proposed cyber attack models and theorems are validated by executing cyber attacks on WSCC 9 bus and IEEE 14 bus test systems by using Siemens PSS/E and MATLAB softwares. Through the proposed theorems, the paper exposes and quantifies the threat of cyber attacks in the electric power grid. The simulation results reveal that the proposed cyber attack models may misrepresent the bus voltage stability, thereby misleading the energy management centre (EMC) operator into taking incorrect countermeasures. The above incorrect actions may force voltage instability which further leads to major interruptions in the electric power supply and possible cascading failure of the electric power grid. Moreover, the proposed theorems and rigorous simulations presented in the paper support the EMC operator in intelligently identifying a cyber attack, thereby enabling development of appropriate corrective actions during such cyber attacks on the smart electric grid. Thus, the concept of proposed methodology could best assist the power system operator to build detection algorithms for discrimination of cyber attacks from electrical faults towards strong electric grid resilience character.