Theological Models and Their Construction

Abstract

The idea the mind deals with reality by constructing and testing models is, of itself, not strikingly new. But attention has been drawn to this subject in recent years because of some developments in physical science, where models have come to play an increasingly important role since the breakdown of the conception the formulated laws of physics were literal descriptions of the laws or inner structure of nature itself. For their use in science has raised parallel questions in other disciplines. In theology, too, it has been proposed-for example, by Ian Ramsey and Frederick Ferrd-that models, either in the looser sense of some handy construct or in the stricter sense of a distinct cognitive device and method, are a useful tool. The present essay, taking up the conception of model in the stricter sense, is directed toward showing what theological models are by analyzing how they are constructed and how they are related to nontheological disciplines. This latter task is important because of what seems to be a great danger in this undertaking, of doing nothing more than giving a theological title to something quite nontheological. The analysis I am making differs from those of Ferre and Ramsey on points where, as I judge the matter, their description of the character and operation of models seems to be either incorrect or inadequate. Ferre and Ramsey have provided contrasting ways of employing models in theology. In 1963 Ferrd published his Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theology,' in which he drew a comparison between the operation of models in natural science and in theology. What is common to both is theories and models are different and one of the functions of models is to make the abstract calculus of the theories immediately perceptible; a model is that which provides epistemological vividness or immediacy to a theory by offering