The wise man is never merely a private citizen: The Roman Stoa in Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Praedae (1604–1608)

1608. Study of the mechanism of atmospheric interaction with the fatigue of metals

Dating the manuscript of De Jure Praedae (1604–1608): What watermarks, foliation and quire divisions can tell us about Hugo Grotius’ development as a natural rights and natural law theorist

1607 POSTER Cancer patients' informational needs about sexuality related issues

Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck's Capture of the Santa Catarina and its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604-1606)

The aim of this article is to cast new light on the textual constitution of some passages of Seneca’s De beneficiis, De clementia, Apolocyntosis, Dialogi and on the text of the anonymous comedy Querolus sive Aulularia. A new edition of De beneficiis, De clementia and Apocolocyntosis for the Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis will be published by R. Kaster, and the author of the article had the occasion of reading a proof of it. In this work, approximately 70 of Seneca’s passages and 5 of the Querolus are discussed, for the majority of which a new conjecture is proposed (the author’s knowledge of the readings of the manuscripts is based only on the reports of the editions). For instance: De ben. 2, 28, 3 instead of fert read fer<a>t; De ben. 5, 4, 2 add itaque <bonus>; De ben. 6, 3, 1 read <ni>si cito; De ben. 6, 37, 2 non est… pudet should be deleted; De ben. 7, 2, 6 instead of prorsus read pronus; De clem. 2, 7, 2 add eius <levius>; Apocol. 4, 3 add <solito> sonum; De ira 3, 28, 3 instead of dolor read dolus; De ira 3, 13, 7 instead of tota read tuta. Cons. ad Helviam matrem 10, 3 instead of potest read potitur. Querolus 26 read fall<er>is.

In the early morning hours of 25 February 1603, the Dutch commander Jacob van Heemskerck (1567-1607) attacked a richly laden Portuguese carrack at the entrance of Singapore Straits. Van Heemskerck's seizure of the Santa Catarina has been a famous episode in Dutch history ever since. This chapter corrects the imbalance in Hugo Grotius scholarship. It compares and contrasts Van Heemskerck's voyage to the East Indies (1601-1604) with its conceptualization in De Jure Praedae. The capture of the richly laden Santa Catarina was literally a godsend for Van Heemskerck, whose voyage to the East Indies had been dogged by bad luck right from the start. Grotius' innovations in legal theory and practice were still far in the future, however, when the Alkmaar and White Lion anchored off Pulau Tiuman in order to intercept the Japan carrack.Keywords: Alkmaar; De Jure Praedae; East Indies; Hugo Grotius; Jacob van Heemskerck; Pulau Tiuman; Santa Catarina; Singapore Straits

Reviewed by: Lucius Annaeus Seneca: Anger, Mercy, Revenge Michael Fournier Robert A. Kaster and Martha C. Nussbaum (trans.). Lucius Annaeus Seneca: Anger, Mercy, Revenge. The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca . Chicago : University of Chicago Press , 2010 . Pp. xxvi + 247 . CDN $51.95 . ISBN 9780226748412 . This is one of a planned eight volumes in the new series from University of Chicago Press, The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, edited by Elizabeth Asmis, Shadi Bartsch, and Martha C. Nussbaum. Natural Questions, translated by Harry M. Hine, and On Benefits, translated by Miriam Griffin and Brad Inwood, have already appeared. For this volume Robert Kaster has translated De ira and De clementia, and Martha Nussbaum the Apocolocyntosis. The editors’ short essay “Seneca and His World” introduces the series, providing overviews of both his philosophical works and his tragedies. Each of the three works in this volume also has its own translator’s introduction. Particularly helpful is Kaster’s introduction to On Anger, which provides a sketch of the structure and argument of the work, as well as an account of its connections to On Clemency. Nussbaum’s discussion of the occasion and purpose of Apocolocyntosis and her account of the genre of Menippean satire are also valuable, though the lack of any notes in her introduction is frustrating (where, a reader might wonder, does one find the account of Claudius wrestling a killer whale? [201]). While none of the works in this volume could be described as “in need” of a new English version, the translations found here not only contribute to the titular goal of the series but also live up to the stated purpose of providing faithful yet idiomatic translations “intended to provide a basis for interpretive work rather than to convey personal interpretations” (xxvi). The editors vow to “eschew terminology that would imply a Judeo-Christian [End Page 410] moral framework (e.g., ‘sin’)” (xxvi), and this is generally the case. However, at one point in his translation of On Anger Kaster in fact renders nihil peccavi by “I’m without sin” (53), showing that he does not rigidly adhere to the principle where it would compromise his translation. The choice of title for this volume is slightly unusual, opting for the more elegant and thematic Anger, Mercy, Revenge in place of a simple yet unwieldy list of the contents (On Anger, On Clemency, The Pumpkinification of Claudius the God). Revenge is a clever way of redescribing the Apocolocyntosis, as well as a subtle indication of the rationale behind collecting these three works in one volume. De ira, one of the 10 works which the manuscripts call Dialogi, and its natural companion piece, the treatise de Clementia, are often paired by editors and translators. The addition of Apocolocyntosis, a difficult-to-categorize satirical work about the divinization of Claudius dating from early in Nero’s reign, makes a good deal of sense not only in terms of the chronology of Seneca’s writings but also in terms of its content. Among the reasons the Senecan authorship of Apocolocytosis has been doubted is the fact that the work revels in its own sense of revenge and thus is at odds with the more or less Stoic teachings of De ira and De clementia. It is not clear why Mercy appears in the title of the volume, as Kaster entitles his translation On Clemency. Comparisons with randomly selected passages in the Latin text show that Kaster’s translations are extremely accurate. He uses “clemency” for clementia throughout, a surprisingly rare choice among English translators, most of whom prefer “mercy.” In fact, a nice continuity between On Anger and On Clemency is added when Kaster renders deprecator animus accessit with “your mind has interceded to plead for clemency” (86). As this translation makes clear, clemency is not simply juridical. It is first and foremost a virtue, and one that is essential for the self’s control of anger. For a cognate virtue, Kaster uses “strictness” for severitas, to my mind a great improvement over the traditional use of the English cognate “severity.” Perhaps more important for those with a philosophical interest in Seneca, a look at crucial definitions and philosophical arguments...

In the De clementia , addressed to the nineteen-year-old Nero, Seneca expresses relief that the freshly minted emperor has shown that he will not ‘forget himself’: Magnam adibat aleam populus Romanus, cum incertum esset, quo se ista tua nobilis indoles daret; iam vota publica in tuto sunt; nec enim periculum est, ne te subita tui capiat oblivio. The Roman people were taking a big gamble, since it was unclear where that noble talent of yours would lead; now the prayers of the people are assured, for there is no risk that you will suddenly forget yourself. ( Cl . 1.1.7) The De clementia , in which this passage appears, and the De beneficiis , the source of the passage quoted at the beginning of Chapter 1, are the two most substantial texts written by Seneca in the first couple of years of Nero's reign and prior to his retirement in ad 62; both most likely date to 55 and 56, the second and third years of the Neronian Principate. The De clementia , explicitly, and the De beneficiis , implicitly, offer advice to the young emperor. Whatever one may conclude about the nature and aim of that advice, Seneca considers what the emperor remembers – or forgets – to be of some importance. As it turns out, this is true not only of the emperor; Seneca regards memory as vital to individuals and society at large. But memory of what? At least in the case of the De clementia , Seneca is quite clear about this.

Hugo Grotius wrote some of his earlier works—the De jure praedae and the Mare Liberum— on direct commission from the United Dutch East India Company (VOC) that sought to legitimize the attack on the Portuguese carrack Sta. Catarina and their continued (violent) expansion to the markets of Southeast-Asia. In the process, Grotius establishes the company as a distinct actor who can wage a just war in a state of nature, and as a subject of its home state. In this article, it is shown how Grotius thoughts on just war, sovereignty, natural law and property were developed while defending both the Dutch right to free trade and the right of United Netherland to wage a just war against their oppressor, the King of Spain and Portugal. But what was stated as the right of all to free trade and to the freedom of the seas also became a powerful argument for the continued violent commercial expansion of the Dutch and the Europeans.

In this article, we discuss the development of the concept of a 'law' (of nature) in the work of the Dutch natural philosopher and experimenter Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692-1761). Since Van Musschenbroek is commonly described as one of the first 'Newtonians' on the Continent in the secondary literature, we focus more specifically on its relation to Newton's views on this issue. Although he was certainly indebted to Newton for his thinking on laws (of nature), Van Musschenbroek's views can be seen to diverge from Newton's on crucial points. We show, moreover, how his thinking on laws of nature was shaped by both international and local factors. We start with a brief discussion of Newton's concept of 'laws of nature' in order to set the stage for Van Musschenbroek's. We then document the development of Van Musschenbroek's views on laws of nature in chronological order. We demonstrate how his thinking on laws of nature was tied to institutional, theological and scientific factors. We conclude by pointing to the broader significance of this case study for our understanding of the development of the concept 'law of nature' during the eighteenth century.

As Susanna Braund observes in her commentary on De Clementia, Seneca frequently employs organic imagery in order to illustrate a symbiotic, natural relationship between a ruler and his subjects (Oxford 2009, 55; 58). Images and vocabulary drawn from the natural world (animal, agricultural, and meteorological) instruct Nero on the nature of his absolute power as princeps and suggest to him how it should be exercised. At Clem. 1.4.1, Seneca famously quotes Georgics 4.212–13 about the beehive’s devotion to its ‘king’ (rege incolumi mens omnibus una, | amisso rupere fidem) to bolster his argument that the safety of ruler and ruled are intertwined. Seneca’s direct quotation of the Georgics in his philosophical works has been noticed, but the subtler ways in which he engages with the poem’s ideas and imagery in the De Clementia have not been fully appreciated. As Christopher Nappa persuasively argues in his book Reading After Actium: Vergil’s Georgics, Octavian, and Rome, the Georgics deploys complex agricultural and cosmological themes to instruct Octavian on the nature of his recently acquired power and provide guidance on how he might navigate the responsibilities of his new role. The poem, then, is an important predecessor for Seneca’s treatise addressed to Nero upon his accession. This chapter highlights significant contributions of the Georgics to the development of Roman imperial ideology by analyzing aspects of Seneca’s reception of Virgil’s poem that have been neglected in previous scholarship.

This chapter seeks to reconstruct the basic elements of Grotian thinking from his two most famous treatises, De jure praedae and De jure belli ac pacis. Both have different biographical and historical backgrounds and an entirely different history of reception. The first is foremost considered as a memorandum to serve commercial interests, whereas the latter is, with some justification, seen to pursue humanist idealism, the systematic ambition of legal scholarship, and the ordering idea of peace. However, since some of what has been called ‘Grotian’ is not much more than a standard taxonomy of the history of ideas, the chapter deals with adaptations of Grotius’ philosophy in natural law thinking and internationalist reception to assess how much of Grotianism came about in later epochs. The many contradictions in the work of Grotius both inspire and invite us to explore the distinctions between moral imperatives and positive international law.

In the author's studies, he had made many references to theological sources. In De jure praedae , as later in De jure belli ac pads , there are many references to the Church Fathers and theologians of the First and Second Scholastica, in primis in Saint Thomas Aquinas, while Grotius does not cite some authors such as Luther and Calvin rather hostile to theory of natural law. In a historical situation facing persistent contrasts between intellectualism Thomist and voluntarism nominalist, Francisco Suarez, the most outstanding representative of the Second Scholastica approached in turn the complex issues of law. Grotius relates to Vazquez de Mechaca and the Spanish Scholastics in general but perhaps should be read in conclusion the character double face of jus gentium as the sign of the impossibility to cut significantly, so rationalist natural law with civil law. Keywords: Second Scholastica, Grotius, Francisco Suarez, jus gentium , Spanish Scholastics, Thomist

Little is known about the law of prize applied in Holland and Zealand before a Court of Admiralty was established in 1488. Even as regards the functioning of this institution, the so-called ‘Admiralty of Vere’, our knowledge is scanty. Yet, the prize law of the Low Countries in the 15th and 16th centuries is not an unimportant subject for research. It is certain that precedents from this period had a considerable influence on Dutch practice after 1572, i.e., during the Republic's war against Spain. Even though the subject of prize law proper has been rather neglected in the otherwise well-studied ‘Golden Age’ of Dutch history, it is evident that the Dutch Republic, a first-rate maritime power, did much to shape important rules of International Law, such as the famous maxims that “blockades must be effective” and that “free ships make free goods”. Obviously, it would be interesting to uncover the historical roots of these much-debated principles of the International Law of maritime warfare. Moreover, an added zest is given to the study of Dutch prize law by its inevitable association with Grotius. His De Jure Praedae , in spite of its promising title, reveals less about Grotius' historical studies than De Jure Belli ac Pads in which a 1438 decision of the Court of Holland concerning the treatment of neutrals is twice quoted.

Universal Principles, Global Cooperation, and Moral Disagreement:A Natural Law Account Joseph Boyle (bio) I. Introduction Since ancient times a number of Western moral views have been described or self-described as "natural law" ethics. These views claim that there are universal moral principles and norms. Moral principles, according to natural law views, are somehow "natural," and, thus, are the common property of those who share human nature. That implies that the principles of the natural law are in principle accessible to all humans. Those who accept this ethical approach are not in full agreement about the precise sense and reference of the expression "natural law" or about the specific moral norms justified by the principles of the natural law. I do not here propose to address these differences among natural law theorists. Instead, I will sketch the approach to universal moral principles that I, as a philosopher working within the natural law tradition, think correct. My approach is within the broad tradition of natural law theorizing inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas; it is the version of Thomistic natural law called the "new natural law theory."1 Natural law theories include a conception of the nature and purpose of morality. Two closely related theses comprise the key elements of this conception. The first is that moral principles, and their implications in moral norms and judgments, are propositional realities having logical relationships and normative content that can be formulated, debated and judged either correct or incorrect. Thus, natural law theory is a form of ethical rationalism; moral judgments are a form of knowledge. The second thesis holds that moral principles are universal in two senses: they are applicable to all human actions, and they are accessible to all human beings capable of the reasoning needed for choice and action. Some immediate implications of these theses are obviously important for thinking about moral diversity, difference and consensus. First, the universal applicability of moral principles implies that there are no human actions, however complex their circumstances and obscure their significance, that are in principle immune from moral assessment. Second, the universal accessibility of the principles of the natural law implies that moral norms, customs, and practices are not finally a matter of local custom or particular circumstance. Criticism in the light of accessible moral principle is always possible. Third, the conjunction of the universal accessibility of natural law and its ethical rationalism makes the possibility of recognizing mistaken moral judgment and practice more than an abstract possibility, but, instead, an ordinary, intelligible aspect of moral life and thought. Any person capable of practical reasoning and choice can access enough of moral principle to criticize his or her own moral beliefs and those of his or her society. That capability is obviously ethically significant. Its availability in reflection to people generally implies that they are not simply stuck with the moral limitations and corruption of their culture, upbringing, and life experience; they have the resources for critical judgment and autonomous action based on that reflection. These claims about the nature of morality may now seem quaint given some defining features of post-modernity. The conjunction of two features of our post-modern world poses a special problem for natural law theory: (1) the rapidly emerging globalization of economic, social and political life; and (2) the pervasiveness of post-modern relativism, and "local-only" conceptions of morality. These conceptions reject the universalist theses I listed above. But they do so in a globalized context calling for moral guidance for the world-wide interactions that transcend the moralities of local communities and their members. Together these features challenge the core convictions of natural law theory. In this contribution, I will briefly articulate and defend these strong natural law claims about the nature of morality, and will bring natural law theory to bear on the challenge posed to them by the realities of our post-modern and globalized situation. I will develop this account as follows: In part II, I will summarize the account of the human good that underlies morality according to natural law theories that follow Aquinas's classic treatment. In Part III, I will sketch an account of how universal moral principles are justified...