The wisdom of African sages

Abstract

The paper explores the role of sage philosophy, founded by Professor H. Odera Oruka of the University of Nairobi, within African philosophy and philosophy in general. It is argued that considerations of sage philosophy raise the larger issue of the relationship of wisdom to philosophy. An early literature of wisdom philosophy, dealing with the art of living, has been marginalized by modern philosophy, where concerns for wisdom are peripheral. Kekes and Blanshard argue, however, that the reflectiveness and judgment involved in wisdom are key philosophical virtues and abilities. Heidegger likewise redefined philosophy as a more meditative, not calculative, activity. Kenyan critics Wanjohi and Masolo, perhaps under the influence of modernist ideas of philosophy, argue that philosophy in the second sense, “commitment to investigation,” is more precious than philosophy in the first sense, commitment to opinions; and they argue that while philosophy in the first sense can be found in traditional Africa, they are not sure that the second sense can be found. Gyekye shows that the marginalization of “commitment to opinion” in philosophy is a distortion, and the idea that today's commitments do not belie a previous investigation is ungenerous. The paper continues by giving an account of some of the wisdom of four Kenyan sages: Makindu, Masero, Manguliechi, and Ayoo. Their insights into the need for love and generosity, and their understanding of the range of human emotions, are found to be insights helpful not only in their Kenyan contexts, but also containing a message for Western countries as well. The paper concludes by referring to the cautionary notes of Kai Nielsen regarding the appropriateness of speaking of “wisdom” in our times, but concludes with Godlovitch that sages help embody the “truth in truisms” while checking our tendency for denial and forgetfulness.