The willingness of submitting waste cooking oil (WCO) to biofuel companies in China: An evolutionary analysis in catering networks

Abstract

The use of waste cooking oil (WCO) in biofuel production can both reduce food safety problems and promote the development of new energy industry. However, to gain higher payoffs, restaurants usually sell total or partial WCO to illegal peddlers. It is of practical significance to study how to improve the willingness of restaurants submitting WCO to biofuel companies. We construct a tripartite game model in the catering network to investigate the dynamic impacts of the intervention of the government, biofuel companies, and consumers on the willingness of restaurants disposing WCO. The results demonstrate that, optimizing the intensity of government supervision and subsidies to restaurants, increasing the demand and the recycling price of biofuel companies for WCO, and strengthening the social responsibility of consumers can effectively improve the willingness that restaurants deal with WCO legally. It is noteworthy that there is a threshold effect on the government fine for restaurants and the recycling price of biofuel companies for WCO. The outcome of blindly increasing these two factors may be inconsistent with the expectation. In addition, the adjustment of a single factor cannot make restaurants in catering networks submit the total WCO to biofuel companies. Therefore, the government should consider promulgating the combination of multiple policies with the coordination of biofuel companies and consumers, to solve the WCO problem better.