The West in the Future: Cultural Hegemony and the Politics of Identity

Abstract

I am writing to comment on Jonathan Friedman's recent article, Past in Future: History and Politics of Identity (AA 94:837-859, 1992). In it Friedman sets a fine example of type of analysis that is needed to understand growing role politics plays in shaping systems, as well as role of global processes in shaping expressions of identity. As is nature of such an endeavor, however, Friedman's conclusions are shaded by his limited sample (Greece and Hawaii). Here I present examples from my fieldwork with Maya cultural activists in Guatemala to make problematic some of Friedman's conclusions, and argue that perhaps Friedman is incorrect in correlating current move toward global cultural dehomogenization with a decline of cultural hegemony. I must preface my comment with a note on concept of culture. Friedman frequently uses adjective (as in Western and history [p. 837], the Western-dominated world [p. 837], Western hegemonic identity [p. 840], and Western social context [p. 855]), but I am left unclear as to what level of abstraction he has in mind when referring to this arguably overused and ambiguous concept. In both social scientific and popular literature, concept of culture is increasingly invoked to explain how global forces effect change in local contexts. While analyses of global systems require a high level of abstraction, scholars are too often lulled into treating West as a homogenous entity that (re)acts similarly in situations of contact around world. One cannot deny many underlying, modernist assumptions about that have spread from Europe, but neither should one overlook internal diversity of this tradition. The post-World War II period of hegemonic expansion of two main branches of 20th-century culture has juxtaposed cultural, political, and geographic borders, thus clouding frontiers between East and West. In matters of politics and economics, Japan is aligned with United States and Europe, although culturally and geographically it remains part of East; likewise, until their recent independence, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan were subjects of Soviet-style culture, although now their young leaders stress Near Eastern heritage of countries. My point is simply that, in such a confusing situation, when one invokes concept of culture, one should clearly specify variety of culture (e.g., as interpreted by Greece, United States, orJapan) and level of abstraction (e.g., elements of contemporary popular culture or underlying assumptions about science, progress, and nature of world). In Guatemala United States acts as prime bearer of contemporary culture. Thus, a Guatemala-centric view may equate contemporary tradition with U.S. pop culture; and in fact, many Maya cultural activists use this equation to contemptuously dismiss values. Nonetheless, current Maya cultural activism-and growth of politics around world-arguably constitutes an expansion of central elements of tradition, elements that predate Cold War and that have been more thoroughly integrated into local traditions than any one trend of recent Euro-American pop culture. These elusive elements-most notably modernist ideas about value and nature of science, progress, and economic development-are often presupposed by researcher and subject alike, a situation that may lead one to erroneously conclude that present mutations and evolution of elements of culture