The welfare implications of Brazil's coffee export price subsidies during the ICA

Abstract

AbstractTo increase coffee export revenues during the International Coffee Agreement, Brazil provided selected purchasers with export rebates that could be used to pay for future coffee purchases. This subsidy mutated and grew over time, encouraged by rent seeking. The subsidy had huge cost to the Brazilian Treasury, $9.8 billion in constant 1982 US dollars, or about 13% of coffee export revenues. As exports were usually quota‐constrained, the subsidy increased Brazil's international coffee price, particularly during 1980–1986, absolutely and relative to its competitors’ prices. The unexpected variation in Brazil's price also caused the New York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange to terminate trading in Brazilian coffee futures, making it more costly to hedge Brazilian coffee until today. The econometric evidence is mixed, but it seems likely the subsidy reduced Brazil's net economic welfare and redistributed income from the Treasury to foreign roasters, domestic exporters, and government bureaucrats.