Abstract
Housing standards are likely to impose quantity constraints on the consumption possibilities of the poor. This paper shows how an exact money metric of the welfare loss from such standards can be derived for any well-behaved preference ordering. Recent results from the theory of consumer behavior under rationing permit the cost of standards to be interpreted in terms of the compensated demand function for the standardized good. A housing demand function for the poor in Jakarta is estimated using household level data and is used to calculate numerically the cost to them of introducing uniformly binding housing standards at unsubsidized prices. Estimates are also presented of the rate of price subsidy on housing needed for compensation.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.