The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories

Abstract

One of the most difficult and interesting problems of rational decision is the choice among possible diverging paths in theory construction and among competing scientific theories—i.e., systems of accurate testable hypotheses. This task involves many beliefs—some warranted and others not as warranted—and marks decisive crossroads. Suffice to recall the current conflict between the general theory of relativity and alternative theories of gravitation (e.g., Whitehead's) that account for the same empirical evidence, the rivalry among different interpretations of quantum mechanics (e.g., Bohr-Heisenberg's, de Broglie-Bohm's, and Landé's), and the variety of cosmological theories (e.g., Tolman's cyclical model and the steady-state theory). They all account for the same observed facts although they may predict different kinds of as yet unknown facts; they are consequently, up to now, empirically equivalent theories even though they are conceptually different and may even involve different philosophical views—i.e., they are conceptually inequivalent.