The Weakness of Sanctioning in Norms-Based Property Systems: An Investigation of Joke Theft

Abstract

This paper investigates practices and patterns of sanctioning violations of exclusivity in norms-based intellectual property systems through a study of joke theft allegations in stand-up comedy. These informal, network-based institutions emerge to define and police property rights in domains where formal legal interventions are absent and, in their place, social norms define exclusivity and guide the adjudication of rights violations. This study finds that, while these regimes are effective in discouraging free-riding, they tend to be ineffective regarding the sanctioning of those that transgress property rights norms for three main reasons. First, making allegations of malfeasance can be costly because of risks of reputational damage and retribution from accused parties, especially if they are socially central, that may lead to penalties regarding career advancement. This discourages policing even in cases where a transgressor’s actions are shared knowledge within the community. Second, it requires accusers to undertake complex strategies of moral entrepreneurship and to possess higher peer esteem and enhanced reputations for norm conformity vis-à-vis their targets. Lastly, opportunities emerge where accusations of plagiarism are decoupled from an act, because allegations can allow for opportunism and can present means of rationalizing discontinuities between status orders, particularly commercial success and peer esteem. These findings emerge from a qualitative study of the stand-up comedy in Los Angeles, which involves data from five years participant observation research of the industry, semi-structured interviews, and archival research of stand-up comedy podcasts.